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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALil'1E R. BENALLY and PER-
LIND~\ BEN ALLY, by her guard-
ian ad litem, ALICE R. BEN ALLY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants~ C 'r ase ..~._~ o. 
vs. 9677 
L. G. ROBINSON, CLIFFORD G. 
ED~IUXDS and LOUIS ''r· 
DUNCAN 
' Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
'1'he statement of facts in the appellants' brief does 
not set forth the eYidence in conflict with that relied 
upon therein, although the fact of inconsistency is 
admitted. }.,or this reason it is necessary that the re-
spondent L. G. Robinson, who 'vas the only defendant 
remaining in the case at the time of the trial, point out 
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such inconsistencies and such other evidence as is per-
tinent to a decision by this court. 
The plaintiffs' decedent, Thomas Dee Benally, 
'vas arrested for public drunkenness by defendant Rob-
inson on the evening of N oyember 26, 1960. It was 
the testimony of the bartender and manager of the 
Havana Club that Benally came into the HaYana Club 
sometime after 5:00 P.l\1:. on the above mentioned 
date and was escorted out of the premises by the witness 
because he was drunk and had been fighting, the latter 
conclusion arising from the fact that Benally had been 
bleeding at the mouth. Once outside the building he 
resumed fighting with other Indians and 'vas knocked 
down on the sidewalk. He was described by the witness 
as being "on the warpath" at that time. (R. 338-339). 
He was subsequently taken into custody at the 73 Inn 
where he was described by an employee as then haYing 
a laceration on his nose and blood on his shirt. (R. 334). 
His continued state of belligerence 'Yas attested by 
his intentionally lurching back,Yards on the steps of 
the jail and landing on top of Officer Robinson. (R. 
112-114, 178-179) . ~...,ollo"'ing this occurrence Robinson 
and Benally "' .. ere admitted to the "booking area" of 
the city jail. 
At this point Robinson con1n1enced searching the 
prisoner as he was required to do. It is clear from the 
evidence that this procedure \Yas undertaken by Robin-
son directly in front of the booking " .. indo" .. as shown 
on Exhibits 5-P and 6-P. Such was the testitnony of 
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James 0. l)ay (R. 31~>) and defendant Duncan, the 
assistant jailer at the time. ( R. 378). 'Vhile being 
searched Benally became Yery hostile and resisted the 
efforts of Robinson to remove a ten dollar bill from 
his watch pocket. (ll. 157, 304-305, 309, 386). Benally 
then dropped down to the floor directly in front of the 
booking window and Robinson placed his legs over 
llenally and removed the ten dollar bill from the prison-
er's pocket. (R. 157, 309, 386-389). After removing 
the bill from Benally's pocket, Robinson testified that 
he released Benally and turned to his left to place the 
ten dollar bill on the counter in front of the booking 
\vindow. (R. 157). Robinson also testified that he re-
leased Benally at the north edge of the booking win-
dow (R. 161) \vhich is forty-five inches south of the 
entrance to the stairway down which Benally fell as 
measured along the west side of the booking area; and 
that Benally traveled backwards approximately 9 feet 
6• inches from the place he was released to the point 
he struck the wire gate. (Exhibit 6-P, R. 171-172, 
175). Robinson's testimony is confirmed by that of the 
jail inmate Day, \vho testified that Officer Robinson 
\Vas facing the booking 'vindow when he had Benally 
between his legs, that Benally had to travel 3 or 4.< 
feet to the stairs after he pulled loose from Robinson 
and that Robinson '\,·as back in toward me, and the 
Indian "·as out t(nvard the front." (R. 314-315). 'fhis 
is also consistent 'vith the testimony of Officer Duncan 
that Robinson \vas directly in front of him at the book-
ing \vindo'v \vhen he saw Benally back into the \vall 
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and fall to his left down the stairway and that Benally 
traveled some 5 or 6 feet back to the wall before he 
fell down the stairs. (R. 379, 389). The evidence is 
undisputed that a person could not fall down the stair-
way from the area in front of the booking window 
because it is separated by a chain link wall from floor 
to ceiling. (Exhibits 3-P and 5-P, R. 173-174). The 
various locations attributed to Officer Robinson on 
Exhibit 6-P are undoubtedly due to the fact that he 
moved toward Benally in an attempt to catch him. (R. 
305, 356, 363, 390, 17 5) . In this regard it should be 
borne in mind that Officer Edmunds did not actually 
observe the events until Benally had already gone half 
way down the stairs ( R. 323-324, 328-329) , and that 
the witness Betty Starks' first obserYation '"as at the 
time that Benally hit the wire door and fell down the 
stairs. (R. 355-360). 
Insofar as appellants rely upon the testunony of 
inmate James 0. Day to establish the fact that Robin-
son had a club in his hand 'vith which he allegedly struck 
Benally upon the head \vhen he was astraddle the 
prisoner, suffice it to say that this "ras absolutely denied 
by Robinson ( R. 178, 365-366) ~ by Duncan ( R. 392) . 
by Mrs. Starks ( R. 356) and the testin1ony of both 
Dr. Swift and Dr. Lindstrom that there \vere no bruises 
or external evidences of injury on the decedent's scalp 
'vhich ,,·ould be expected if such blo,vs had actually 
been adminstered. (R. 124-125, 127~ 136). In addition 
there was evidenee that Robinson had a cigar in his 
hands when he brought Bena.lly into the booking area. 
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( R. a~8-349. :;~2). ,_fhe j urr's finding against the 
appellants upon this point is clearly supported by the 
evidence. 
Day's further state1nent that he heard Edmunds 
say to Robinson that he "'asn't going to accept prisoners 
that \vere beat up and that said statement was made 
before Benally fell down the stairs was refuted by 
l)uncan, 'vho testified that he heard a remark to the 
effect that anyone "·ho \vas injured would not be booked 
and that this remark \\'as made after Benally had fallen 
do,vn the stairs and been carried back to the booking 
area. ( R. 391-397). Duncan also testified that he never 
heard any re1nark to the effect that "Robby, if you 
don't stop beating these fellows up, I am not going to 
book them." (R. 391). Robinson also denied that any 
statement such as, "Robinson, if you don't quit beating 
these guys up I am going· to quit taking them," was 
ever made by Edn1unds during the booking of Benally. 
( R. 349-:3~30) . Actually Day admitted that it was not 
too clear to him "Then the alleged staten1ent was made. 
(R. 310). Again the jury's determination that there 
"'aS no unreasonable use of force employed by Robinson 
in this case is supported by the evidence . 
.r\ppellants rely heavily upon the deposition of 
'fhomas L. Casteel, 'vho had been booked in the city 
jail for federal probation violation just prior to the 
booking of l~enally, 'vhich deposition "Tas taken in 
Evanston. ''Tyoming on November 8, 1961. In par-
ticular they lay rnuch "Teight upon the "Titness' testi-
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mony that ( 1) he observed a club in Robinson's hand 
when the officer brought Benally into the booking area, 
(2) he heard Edmunds say, ''Robinson, if you don't 
quit beating these guys up I am going to quit taking 
them" prior to Benally's fall down the stairs and (3) 
that James Day, another inmate '"ho continued to 
watch the booking of the prisoner, turned to Casteel 
and said, "Robinson has knocked him down the steps." 
The incredulous nature of this evidence, together with 
its absolute inconsistency with the former testimony 
of both Casteel and Day, must be pointed out. 
In the first place, Casteel testified at the inquest 
held in Salt Lake City on December 6, 1960, imme-
diately following Benally's death and while he was 
still an inmate of the city jail, that (a) he sa"~ Benally 
for the first time \vhen the officers were carrying him 
from the booking area into the cell block on the main 
floor ( R. 342) , (b) he did not see Benally at any time 
during the booking or "Then he "~as first brought into 
the jail, but only heard the1n booking him ( R. 34-:t) , 
(c) they had brought Benally back up the stairs after 
his fall \V hen Casteel first sa"~ hi1n ( R. 3~4) , and (d) 
that he was three to ten feet to the right of the doorway 
into the main floor cell block "~bile Benally "~as being 
booked. (R. 345-346). 1\.s a natural consequence of 
the foregoing testimony, Casteel neYer n1entioned any-
thing at all about a club in Robinson's hand at the 
inquest. Day's testimony at the inquest confirms that 
of Casteel giYen in the sa1ne proceeding-. Day testified 
that he was the only person \Vho sa"~ the club in Robin-
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son's hand (It. 30~3) but that Casteel did observe thetn 
drag llenally into the cell block after he had fallen. 
1\ t the ti1ne of his deposition, ho,vever, Casteel claimed 
that he didn't haYe an opportunity to testify about the 
club at the inquest (R. 241-242, 244) and then at-
tempted to explain the total inconsistency between his 
former testimony and that given in the subsequent 
deposition relating to his observation of events leading 
up to Benally's fall upon the basis that his answers 
given at the inquest 'vere directed to the point in time 
at \Yhich he was first able to make positive identification 
of Benally "·ith relation to a picture of the decedent. 
(R. 251-255). The absurdity of such an explanation 
is apparent-it 'vouldn't matter at which point in the 
continued observation of a series of events involving 
a particular individual that the observer could make 
positiYe identification of the individual with relation 
to a photograph, for having once made such identifica-
tion the precedent events involving that individual, as 
'vell as those subsequent thereto, become an integral 
"·hole for the purpose of "first" observation. This is 
so clearly part and parcel of everyday experience that 
it "·ould not seem to admit of doubt. 
Secondly, the unreliable nature of Casteel's testi-
mony given at the above mentioned deposition is irrefut-
ably established hy his testimony that Day turned to 
him and said ''Robinson has knocked him down the 
steps." That this mental concoction 'vas blended from 
the ingredients of pure fabrication is conclusively 
proven by the testimony of Day himself given at the 
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inquest and received in evidence below. Day testified 
that Benally was not being cooperative when he \\~as 
being searched and in the course of the struggle with 
Officer Robinson he broke away off balance and fell 
down the stairs. When asked if Robinso·n pushed 
Benally or anything of that sort he answered_, "'"No_, 
sir.-'-' (R. 309). The jury chose not to believe Casteel's 
testimony-indeed, any other conclusion would have 
been subject to serious doubt. 
Finally, it should also be pointed out that Casteel 
was, at the time of events involved in this la"'"Suit and 
at the time of his deposition, on probation from the 
United States District Court in Cheyenne, ''ryoming, 
after having entered a plea of guilty to charges of 
committing mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail 
fraud. (R. 238-239, 257-258). His apparent bias 
against Utah la'v enforcement officials 'vho picked him 
up for probation violation is evident from his reluctance 
to return to Utah on the ground that he didn't ""\\"an1 
any part of Utah" or "anything to do with Utah" be .. 
cause of his sad experiences there. ( R. 257) . 
''rith regard to the heayy 'vire Inesh door at the 
head of the stairs do"~n "~hich Benally fell, it ""as the 
undisputed evidence of Assistant C'hief of Police Stein-
feldt, under 'vhose supervision the city jail ""as. and is, 
operated, that Officer Robinson had no obligation as 
part of his duty in booking Benally to check doors 
and other facilities of the jail itself to determine 
whether or not they were being maintained in accord-
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ance "·ith police departtnent directives. (R. 193, 196). 
r1,hat responsibility "·as reposed in those directly in 
charge of the jail facilities. (R. 192-193). Chief Stein-
feldt testified that, prior to the time that the gate was 
installed. the procedure was to book the prisoners and 
then take then1 downstairs for detention in the course 
of 'vhich some of the prisoners fell down the stairs, 
"·hereas, subsequent to the installation of the gate, the 
prisoners \Yere booked and placed in the main cell block 
to avoid taking· them downstairs. (R. 184). It would 
appear therefrom that the problem of prisoners falling 
do,vn the stairs stemmed from the necessity of taking 
the prisoners do"·n the stairway and not from the mere 
fact that a stairway existed or that persons were falling 
down the stairs otherwise than in the course of attempt-
ing to navigate the same. It ,,·as also Chief Steinfeldt's 
testi1nony that he "·as a'vare that the gate at the head 
of the stairs was held back in an open position to facili-
tate the feeding of prisoners and cleanup of the jail 
by trusty prisoners and that he had seen such a practice 
on several occasions. ( R. 193-194) . He further testified 
that the booking officer was required to search prisoners 
and remove valuables from their persons in the booking 
area. ( R. 364 ) . 
Robinson testified that the first time he noticed 
the door "·as open at the head of the stairs "ras \\·hen 
Benally "·ent through it. (R. 181). He also testified 
that he had not taken his eyes off the prisoner during 
the booking procedure. (R. 183). It should also be 
noted that the opening of the door from the reception 
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room to the booking area would, to a great degree, 
obscure the arresting officer's vision of the stairway 
and the position of the gate at the top thereof. (Ex-
hibits 3-P, 4-P and 6-P). As a matter of fact, the 
clarity of vision through successive panels of wire mesh 
of the sort involved herein leaves much to be desired 
and, in the absence of studied scrutiny, could not be 
expected to leave vivid impressions with a casual ob-
server. (See Exhibit 3-P) . 
ARGUMEN'l' 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID XOT ERR IN 
REFUSING TO SUBMI'l., THE CASE TO 'l'HE 
JURY ON THE 'THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE. 
First of all, the lower court did not err in refusing 
to instruct the jury upon the theory of negligence be-
cause there was no evidence in the record to support 
such a finding against defendant Robinson. In order 
that there may be actionable negligence, there must be 
a duty or obligation on the part of the person charged 
with negligence, and a breach of such duty. Industrial 
Commission of Utah ·c. Jr,. asatch Grading Companzf, 
80 U. 223, 14 P.2d 988; 38 Am. Jur.~ ~'egligence~ Sec. 
12; 65 C.J.S.~ !\' egligence~ Sec. ~. The plaintiffs' theory 
of negligence on the part of defendant Robinson is 
based on (a) his failure to close the door at the head 
of the stair"·ay, or (b) his failure to keep Benally 
10 
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under control h~r releasing hitn in the booking area 
after retnoYing the $10 bill from his person. As to the 
first claitn of negligence above noted, the evidence is 
conclusive and undisputed that no duty existed on the 
part of the defendant Robinson to maintain the jail 
faeilities, including doors contained therein, in accord-
ance \vith police department regulations. (R. 193, 196}. 
As to the second claim of negligence relied upon 
it is likewise undisputed that the force employed by 
ll,obinson in restraining Benally immediately prior to 
his fall \vas necessitated by the latter's failure to co-
operate with the officer in having his person searched 
and \Vas not precipitated by any hazard to the physical 
safety of the prisoner. After removing the $10 bill 
from the pocket of Benally as he was required to do, it 
\vas only natural that Robinson would release Benally 
from the physical restraint which the officer had by 
necessity employed to discharge his duty in removing 
all Yaluables from his person. Indeed, it is provided by 
statute that, in making an arrest, " ( t) he defendant 
must not be subjected to any more restraint than is 
necessary." Section 77-13-2, Utah (lode Annotated 
1953. It is clear in this case that it was no longer 
necessary for the arresting ofl'icer to continue the 
ph~rsical restraint of holding ]Jenally bet,veen his legs 
for the purpose of removing the $10 bill fro1n hitn. 
,.fhe need for the initial imposition of physical restraint 
had exhausted itself. and it "rould be a most unjust 
requirement to hold that the restraint employed by 
Robinson for one purpose should haYe been continued 
11 
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for a completely unrelated purpose, particularly when 
the evidence indicates that the officer was unaware of 
circumstances which would require the latter. In addi-
tion to the evidence that Robinson had no duty or 
obligation with respect to the door, the evidence un-
disputedly establishes that there 'vas no danger that 
reasonably could have been foreseen by Robinson in 
releasing Benally at the time he did for Benally was 
on his hands and knees in front of the booking window 
and that portion of the booking area was protected 
from the stairs by a chain link wall from floor to ceiling. 
It V{as further established that Robinson didn't even 
know that the door at the head of the stairs was open 
until Benally went through it because his attention 
had been entirely devoted to his prisoner. 
This court has ruled that, in determining whether 
conduct meets the standard of care for the ordinary 
reasonable and prudent person under the circum-
stances, the test is to be applied on the basis of foresight 
and not of hindsight. Lazcrence v. Ba1nberger Railroad 
Co1npany~ 3 U.2d 247, 282 P.2d 335. See also The 
Ger11zanic~ 196 U.S. 589 49 L. Ed. 610, 25 S.Ct. 317. 
In this connection, it has been held by this court that 
reasonable foreseeability of dang'er or risk of harm 
to another is an essential element in the proof of negli-
gent conduct. HilllJard v. lltah BlJ-Products Co., I 
U.2d 143, 263 P.2d 287. See also Annotation 155 
' A.L.R. 157. Further1nore, the doctrine is elementary 
that in cases 'Yhere the maxim of res ipsa loquitur does 
not apply negligence ·malJ not be prcsu1n ed or inferred 
12 
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l!lcrely because an accident occurred. (J_uiiln v. Utah 
Gas & ( 'okc (}o., 4~ lT. IIH~ 129 P. 362, 43 L.R.r\. 
(X.S.) a:.!8. r\nd the failure to guard against a bare 
possibility of accident is not actionable negligence. 
BradlJ 1\ Southern Rail7.ca.tJ (1ornpany~ 320 U.S. 476, 
88 L.Ed. ~:39, 64 S. Ct. 232. It is also stated in 38 
.. JnL Jur., 1.\Tegliycncc, Sec. 2~, p. 670, that "the duty 
to use due care arises from probabilities, rather than 
fro1n bare possibilities, of danger." In applying the 
above rules to the facts and circumstances of the present 
ease~ it is clear that the foreseeability or probability 
of injury occurring to Benally was too remote at the 
time and place he \\'as released from physical restraint 
by Robinson to submit to the jury on the theory of 
negligence. 'ro permit a jury to consider negligence as 
a basis of recovery under the facts and circumstances 
of this case would be to permit the jury to speculate. 
This they may not do. Olsen v. Warwood~ 123 U. Ill, 
255 P.2d 725, and cases therein cited. The accidental 
nature of Benally's fall down the stairs was graphically 
revealed by the jail inmate James 0. Day, who testi-
fied that it surprised Robinson as much as it did the 
Indian. ( R. 305) . 
'l"he plaintiffs' second theory of negligence, i.e., 
the failure of Robinson to keep Benally under physical 
control, is also inseparably connected "'ith their first 
claim of negligence relating to the failure to close the 
door at the head of the stairs, for the accident would 
not haYe occurred under either circumstances had the 
door been closed. r\.s 've have seen there "'as no duty 
13 
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on Robinson's part to keep that door closed. It 'vould 
follow therefrom that liability should not be predicated 
upon the second theory of negligence in the absence 
of actual knowledge by Robinson that the door was 
open for, as was said in Chiuchiolo v. New England 
Wholesale Tailors~ 84 N.H. 329, 150 A.540, 544, one 
is not required to anticipate against dangers which it 
is not his duty to avoid. There is no evidence in the 
record to sustain the fact that Robinson actually 
observed that the door was open prior to the time that 
Benally fell through it. In view of the foregoing analy-
sis, it seems clear that the lower court did not err in 
failing to instruct the jury upon negligence in this case. 
Even if this court should find that the record in 
this case does contain evidence of negligence on the 
part of Officer Robinson, it must affirm the verdict 
and judgment of the lower court on the ground that 
such evidence consists solely of acts of omission or 
nonfeasance in the performance of governmental duties 
for 'vhich a police officer is exonerated from liability. 
Likewise, the sumn1ary judgment entered in favor of 
defendants-respondents Edmunds and Duncan must 
be affirmed for the sa1ne reason. 
In the case of Mo.lJnihan t'. Todd~ 188 ~lass. 301, 
108 Am. St. Rep. J73, 74 N.E. 367, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted the rule (both 
English and American) to the following effect: 
"It has al"~ays been held in the Atnerican 
courts that an agency of gover1unent or a public 
14 
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ofl'icer, \\·bile perforrning a duty imposed solely 
for the benefit of the public, is not liable for a 
1nere failure to <lo that which is required by the 
statute. X egligencc that is nothing rnore than 
on1ission or nonfeasance creates no liability." 
( l~ iting many cases.) 
'fhe court then applied the rule to the facts of the case 
and concluded as follows: 
'' Jfr e are of the opinion that the principle "lchich 
underlies the rule that public officers and other 
agencies o.f government are not liable for ncgli-
r;cnce in the performance of public duties yoes 
no further than to relive them from liability for 
nonfeasance and for the misfeasance of their 
scr7..'rt nts or agentt~. For a personal act of mis-
feasance "re are of opinion that a party should 
be held liable to one injured by it as well when 
in the performance of a public duty as when 
otherwise engaged." (Emphasis added) . 
In the later case of Trum v. Town of Paxton, 329 
)lass. ·~HJ~ 109 N.E. 2d 116, the Massachusetts court 
again conf-lrn1ed the holding in 111 O/J nihan v. Todd and 
held that a public officer, "-hile performing his duties 
imposed solely for the benefit of the public, is not liable 
for a mere failure to do that which is required by 
statute~ and his negligence which amounts to nothing 
h . . ~~ f 1· 1nore t an an omission ~ non easance, creates no la-
bility. The court further held that "nonfeasance" is 
the omission of an act 'vhich a person ought to do, and 
"misfeasance" i5 the improper doing of an act 'vhich 
a person might la,vfully do. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah expressly 
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adopted the ruling of the Mo/jnilzan case in Lowry v. 
Carbon Co1.tnty et al.~ 64 U. 555, 232 P. 908, decided 
in 1924. The facts of the two cases were very similar 
involving injuries sustained as a result of road blasting 
operations. The Utah court adopted the holding of the 
Massachusetts court in a distinct and all-inclusive man-
ner as follows at pages 910-911 of 232 Pacific Reporter: 
"Here there is charged an active personal par-
ticipation in the doing of a lawful thing in a neg-
ligent manner. The case of Moynihan v. Todd~ 
188 Mass. 301, 74 N.E. 367, 108 Am. St. Rep. 
473, in our judgment, announces the correct 
principle applicable to the case here presented 
upon the pleadings. 
" * * * 
''The (Massachusetts) court thus proceeds to 
announce the rule generally applicable to public 
officers, as follows: 
" 'Follo,ving this rule, it al"~ays has been held 
in the American courts that an agency of govern-
ment or a public officer, 'vhile performing a 
duty imposed solely for the benefit of the public, 
is not liable for a 1nere failure to do that which 
is required by the statute. Negligence that is 
nothing more than an on1ission or nonfeasance 
creates no liability.' 
"After citing numerous authorities in support 
of this doctrine, the l\Inssachusetts court pro-
ceeds, as follows: 
'~ '''r e are. of the opinion that the principle 
'vlnch underhes the rule that public officers and 
other agencies of govern1nent are not liable for 
negligence in the perfor1nance of public duties 
16 
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goes no further than to relieve them from lia-
bility for nonfeasance, and for the 1nisfeasance 
of their servants and agents. For a personal act 
of misfeasance, we are of the opinion that a 
party should be held liable to one injured by it, 
as \vell "·hen in the performance of a public duty 
as \vhen otherwise engaged, * * * But for acts 
of misfeasance of a servant or agent in such 
cases, there is no liability. This is because the 
rule respondeat superior does not apply. * * * 
rrhe result is that, if the jury in the present 
case find that the defendant was personally neg-
ligent in causing the rock to be blasted 'vithout 
taking proper precaution for the safety of per-
sons rightfully in the vicinity, a verdict should 
be rendered against him, but if there was no neg-
ligence in blasting the rock, or if the only neg-
ligence was that of the defendants' servants or 
agents, he is not liable.' 
"Having approved of the doctrine announced 
by the Massachusetts court in the last-mentioned 
case, it necessarily follows that the lower court 
was in error in sustaining the demurrer as to the 
defendants county commissioners, in view of the 
allegations of the complaint that said defend-
ants, and each of them, were 'actually engaged' 
in the performance of the work complained of, 
and that the defendants, and all of them, 'care-
lessly and negligently participated in the act 
complained of.' " 
It is clear, therefore, that the Lo'lory case is un-
controverted authority for the proposition that a public 
officer is liable only for negligent acts of commission 
constituting misfeasance in the discharge of his gov-
ernmental duties and is not liable for acts of nonfeas-
17 
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ance. The subsequent case of Roe 1,. Lundstrom_, 89 L:. 
520, 57 P.2d 1128, affirmed the ruling in Lowry by 
holding as follow~:: 
"It is a general rule that a municip~l offic~r 
is immune from liability in a private s~It ~or h1s 
acts in the discharge of corporate duties In the 
absence of willful negligence_, malic~,. or corrup-
tion, constituting misfeasance."" (Citing cases.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
By the use of the term '\villful negligence * * * 
constituting Inisfeasance" the court has clearly rec-
ognized the difference between acts of omission for 
which the law will exonerate a public officer from lia-
bility in the performance of his governmental duties 
and acts of commission for which he will be answerable 
in damages to one injured thereby. It thus follo"\\rs 
that, in order to sustain a claim for damages against 
police officers arising out of the performance of their 
prescribed duties, the clai1nant 1nust show something 
more than nonfeasance or the failure of the officer to 
do an act which he should haYe done. As stated by our 
Supreme Court that something Inore n1ust a1nount to 
an act of "'illful negligence, or as other,vise stated, 
misfeasance. 
In the case of Rozclcy 'll. ("edar Ra]Jids. ~03 lo,va 
1245, 212 N.l,r. 158~ 53 A.L.R. 375~ the court cited 
and sustained the rule of the 111 O/Jilihan case. and af-
firmed the holding in previous lo\\·a cases that an aaent 
b 
"·ho performs a governn1ental functio11 on behalf of 
a county is no 1nore responsible for 11egligence in so 
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doing than the corporation for \vhich he acts, but did 
so on the basis that in such cases the acts charged as 
negligence 'vere acts of nonfeasance relating to the 
condition of highways and acts on1itted in preparing 
the same for use. 
'l'he court also cited the case of Wood t'. Boone 
County, 153 Iowa 92,133 N.\,r. 377,39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
168, Ann. Cases 1913 D. 1070, wherein the act com-
plained of 'vas one of nonfeasance, the failure to fur-
nish relief to a pauper, in which the municipal officer 
\vas held immune from liability. Thus the court recog-
nized the "well-recognized distinction between acts of 
nonfeasance, and those of misfeasance'' and held that 
a public officer is personally liable for acts of mis-
feasance while he is engaged in the performance of 
governmental duties. 
Again in Smith v. Iotca City~ 213 Io"·a 391, 239 N.,,r. 29, 31, the court pointed out the difference be-
tween acts constituting nonfeasance, such as the failure 
of city officers to maintain park equipment in repair 
and in a safe condition for the use of the public, and 
acts of commission constituting misfeasance, and con-
cluded that city officers 'votdd not be individually liable 
for acts of nonfeasance as above stated. 
But in the case of Hibhs t'. IndetJendent School 
District, 218 Io,,·a 841, 251 :N ·''r· 606, the court made 
no distinction between acts of misfeasance and acts of 
nonfeasance and held that exemption from liability 
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extended to municipal officers for all their negligent 
acts. 
In overruling the Hibbs case, insofar as it exempted 
municipal officers from personal liability for their neg-
ligent acts of misfeasance, it was stated in Montanick 
v. McMillan~ 225 Iowa 442, 280 N. ''T. 608, as follows: 
"In the case of Hibbs v. Independent School 
District~ * * * this court made no distinction 
between acts of misfeasance and acts of non-
feasance. However, it is interesting to note that 
the cases cited and relied upon in the Hibbs case 
are all cases of nonfeasance and there is not a 
single case cited that holds the agent or em-
ployee is not liable for an act of misfeasance. 
* * * Nowhere, except in the Hibbs case, do "ye 
find that the agent or employee himself, "yhen 
sued as an individual, rather than in his official 
capacity, is not liable for acts of misfeasance, 
that is, a positiYe negligent act 'vhich caused in-
jury and damage to another.'' 
The court then rea.ffirn1ed the holdings of Jloynihan~ 
Rowley and Smith, and concluded as follo,vs: 
"An act of misfeasance is a positive "yrong, 
and every employee, "yhether e1nployed by a 
private person or n 1nunicipal corporation, o"~es 
a duty not to injure another by a negligent act 
of com1nistYion. It is the breach of this dutv 'vhich 
the la"r i1nposes on nil Inen that is inYolv.ed, and 
this general obli,qation to injure no nzan bij an 
act of 11zisfeasance is neither increased nor tdinz .. 
inishcd b.tJ the .fact th~1~ the negligent parflJ is 
an clnplo.tJCe of a 1nunu·zpal corporation.n (En1 .. 
phasis added) . 
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'fhe rule laid down in the 1ll ontanick case, that an 
e1nployee of a 1nunicipality is liable for an act of mis-
feasance on his part, notwithstanding the fact that he 
is engaged in the performance of a governmental func· 
tion, \\·as expresslr adopted and reaffir1ned in Shirkey 
v. [(cokuk ( 1ounty, 225 Iowa 1159, 281 N.W. 837. 
To the same effect is the case of Milstrey v. City of 
Hackensack. 6 N.J. 400, 79 A.2d 37, wherein the court 
cited 1lloynihan v. Todd~ Florio v. Jersey City~ 101 
X .J .L. 535, 129 A. 470, 40 A.L.R. 1353 and 37 -L1 m,. 
J ur. 887, and declared the rule as follows: 
"Municipal officers are not liable for damage 
resulting from mere passive nonfeasance, unless 
the liability arises by statute, but they are liable 
for damage resulting from their active mis-
feasance in performance of their public works.\' 
And in the case of I~arson v. Yuma County~ 26 
I\_riz. 367, 225 P. 1115, the court held that neither a 
county nor its officers are liable for the death of one 
killed when his automobile ran off a highway bridge 
" .. hich had been negligently Inaintained without a guard 
railing, such maintenance being a governmental func-
tion. 
In an annotation in 60 A.L.R. 2d 873, at page 
879, it is stated that " (a) peace officer, as a general 
rule, is personally liable for negligent or wrongful 
acts causing personal injury or death" and is supported 
by numerous authorities. In checking a random selec-
tion of cited cases from Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, ~Iaryland, 
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~Iichigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, X e,,. Hampshire, 
New Jersey, N e'v Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Utah, \\T ashington, ''Tisconsin and 
\Vyoming, only one case was found which did not in-
volve an act of commission, or misfeasance, upon the 
part of the public officer for which recovery was being 
sought and allowed by the courts. All the other cases 
involved injuries sustained by reason of shooting, as-
sault and battery, automobile collision, etc. The single 
exception was the case of Dunham v. Village of Can-
isteo~ 303 N.Y. 498, 104 :\T.E. 2d 872, "·herein the 
Court of Appeals of New York held that, u:here the 
officers assu1ned charge of a 76 year old man "·ho "·as 
found lying on the floor of the fire station, muttering 
incoherently and apparently suffering from cold and 
pain, such officials were under an obligation to exercise 
ordinary care, including procurement of Inedical assist-
ance, if they knew or should haYe kno"·n that the man 
"·as hurt or injured and in need of a doctor. After con-
finement in jail for 18 hours, not as a result of arrest 
for violating anlJ lu'ti) or ordinance but to keep hinz 
warm~ he was prov-ided medical care but subsequently 
succumbed from pnetnnonia. It "·ill be noted that this 
case did not involYe the exercise of goyerm11ental duties 
by said officers but did involv-e a duty to exercise ordi-
nary care after they had asstn11ed charge of caring for 
the deceased. }..,urthermore, the court especially noted 
that municipal corporations no longer enjoyed sove-
relgn iininunity in N e"· \...-ork State. 
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In any eYent the ruling in the Dnnham case was 
rendered ineffective hy the Ia ter decision of the Court 
of r\ppeals of N e\\' York in Bernard v. Village of 
.A·lndover, (1960) 7 N.Y. 2d 1050, 200 N.Y.S. 2d 437, 
"·hich held that police officers 'vere not under a duty 
to secure medical treatment for decedent whose bladder 
had been ruptured as a result of a fight in a bar, where 
the officers directed his removal from the street by 
persons 'vho volunteered to take him home and the 
officers thereafter called upon him at his dwelling to 
quiet him after receiving complaints from neighbors 
that his moaning and groaning was disturbing the 
peace. 
A close examination of the cases cited in appel-
lants' brief indicates that they involve acts of misfeas-
ance or, as pointed out in Milstrey v. City of Hacken-
sack~ supra~ liability arises by statute creating affirma-
tive duties. Thus, in Clark v. l(elly, 101 W. Va. 650, 
133 S.E. 365, 46 A.L.R. 799, the holding of the court 
was based upon a statute and city ordinance setting 
forth the affirmative duties of a jailor and the facts also 
involved the element of 'villful wrongdoing by the 
officer in placing the plaintiff in a flooded jail cell. In 
Hunt v. Rowton~ 143 Okla. 181, 288 P. 342, the case 
turned on a specific statutory requirement that the 
sheriff isolate prisoners 'vith contagious diseases. In 
Bukaty t\ Berglund~ 179 Kan. 259, 294 P.2d 228, the 
action involved the use of sulphur dioxide gas to subdue 
a jail inmate, resulting in his death, and the issue in 
that case 'vas not negligence but whether or not there 
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had been an unnecessary use of force. Insofar as the 
Kansas Court refers to negligence in the foregoing de-
cision, it must have application solely to the facts 
therein recited which clearly constitute an act of com-
mission or misfeasance. In Thornas v. Williams (Ga. 
1962) 124 S.E. 2d 409, acts of misfeasance, such as 
the pouring of \Vater on burning mattresses thereby 
increasing the smoke hazard and defendant's affirma-
tive action in refusing to permit others to remove the 
prisoner from the smoke-filled jail, were clearly called 
into issue in the court's decision. In addition to the 
foregoing the case of .Justice v. Rose~ 102 Ohio App. 
482, 144 N.E. 2d 303, actually held opposite to the 
claim of the appellants. The court in that case stated 
that " ( i) n all the cases where liability of the officer 
has been sustained for injuries inflicted by another 
prisoner the facts show a zcillful and h_~nou.:n neglect 
* * * '' and then concluded that such a showing had not 
been made and therefore sustained the lo,ver court's 
demurrer to the plaintiff's petition. (Emphasis ours). 
The appellants also cite the Utah case of Richard-
son v. Capwell~ 63 U. 616~ 176 P. 205, in support of 
their position. It is clear that the court~s determination 
that the plaintiff "·as entitled to have his damages 
determined "·ith respect to the defendant's failure to 
furnish food for jail prisoners and to keep the jail '"arn1 
and sanitary "·as purely Yoluntary and gratuitously 
offered by the court outside the issue presented in the 
appeal. It is also apparent that such acts as \vere there 
in ,·olved derive from a known affirinatiYe duty the 
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breach of "·hieh partakes of a zcillful disregard for the 
rights of others. 
Insofar as the defendant-respondent Robinson is 
concerned, his claimed acts of negligence consisted 
n1erely of acts of o1nission or nonfeasance unaccom-
panied br any aspect of willfulness in the performance 
of his official duties and, therefore, the judgment of 
the lower court should be affirmed even if such claimed 
acts are held by this court to be sufficient evidence of 
negligence to otherwise warrant submission to a jury. 
It also follows, as a matter of law, that the com-
plaint, as it is supported by the contentions of the 
plaintiffs-appellants, was properly dismissed by the 
lower court as to defendants-respondents Edmunds 
and Duncan for the reason that no act of misfeasance 
or \Yillful misconduct upon their part is alleged or 
claimed by said plaintiffs-appellants. The only acts 
complained of by them insofar as these two defendants-
respondents are concerned, are acts of omission (i.e., 
failure to close the wire door at the head of the stairs, 
failure to assist Robinson in booking the decedent, 
and failure to do such other acts as would have pre-
vented the decedent from falling down the stairs), 
unaccompanied by any allegation of "·illfulness. for 
"·hich said defendants-respondents cannot be held per-
sonally responsible in an action for datnages by the 
survivors of the decedent. 
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POIN'f II 
THE TRIAL COUR'l, DID N0,-1~ ERR IK 
ADMITTING 'THE 'l,ES'l,MONY 0~~ THE DE-
FENDANT LOl;Is ''r· DUNCAN ''rHICH 
HAD BEEN GI,TEN PRE,TIOLTSLY 1\'l., ,-l.,HE 
CORONER'S INQUEST. 
Shortly before the date set for trial in the lower 
court, the defendant-respondent Louis "\V. Duncan, 
who had previously been dismissed as a defendant in 
the lawsuit, was seriously injured in the performance 
of his duties as a jailer at the city jail and was hos-
pitalized at the St. :\larks Hospital as a result of said 
injuries. A subpoena 'Yas issued by the defendant Rob-
inson for the appearance of Duncan as a witness on 
Robinson's behalf at the trial but "'"as returned un-
served by the process server because of Duncan's 
hospitalization. During the course of the trial it "'"as 
ascertained by the court to its satisfaction that the 
medical condition of Duncan "'"as such that it "'"ould not 
pern1it of his removal fro1n the hospital for the purpose 
of testifying in the trial on Robinson's behalf. The 
court thereupon per1nitted the testimony of )Ir. Dun-
can which ",.as giYen at an inquest into the death of 
'l.,homas D. Benally held before C'ity Judge Arthur 
,J. Mays in Salt Lake C'ity, on Decen1ber 6-7, 1960, 
and reported by lla (~. Ste"'"art. one of the official court 
reporters of the 'J~hird District Court, to be read into 
evidence in this case. 
'fhe appellants object to the use of such eYidence 
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on the ground that they have been deprived of their 
right to cross examine the witness with respect to 
statetnents he is alleged to have made to one Mr. Greg-
ory for the purpose of a polygraph examination sub-
sequent to the inquest. 'I'he appellants were free to 
call :\Ir. Gregory as a witness to testify as to his knowl-
edge in this matter but did not do so. 
At the time of the inquest, counsel for appellants 
\\·as present during all of the proceedings and had the 
opportunity to cross exan1ine all the witnesses who 
testified. (R. 253-254). Mr. Hanni claims that he rep-
resented the Navajo Tribe at that time and not Mrs. 
Benally. (R. 371). 
Inasmuch as the lower court relied heavily upon 
the recent work of Professor Charles T. McCormick 
(Professor of Law, University of Texas) on the Law 
of Evidence in admitting the former testimony of Mr. 
Duncan given at the inquest, it would appear advisable 
to revie'v the more pertinent portions of that work as 
contained in Chapter 26 thereof. 
'l'he appellants attack the admissibility of the 
former testimony of l\Ir. Duncan primarily on their 
claimed denial of the right to cross examine the witness. 
Indeed this i1nportant right is the basis for the historical 
require1nents of "identity of parties" and "identity of 
issues" in adn1itting former testi1nony, and we refer 
the court to the 1nodern rules espoused by ~icCormick, 
and supported by court decisions and other authorities. 
''rith respect to the requirement of "identity of par-
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ties" it is stated as follows at page 489 of McCormick 
on Evidence: 
"Moreover under what seems the practical 
and expedien't view, if the party against whom 
the former testimony is now offered though not 
a party to the former suit, nor in 'privit~' as a 
successor in interest of any party therein, yet 
actually cross-examined the witness (personally 
or by counsel) about the matters "Thich he would 
now want to cross-examine about, or \\ ... as ac-
tually accorded a fair opportunity for such cross-
exanlination and had a like motive for such 
exa1nination, then the former testimony may be 
received. Finally, the natural next step is to 
recognize, as progressive courts have done, that 
neither identity of parties nor privity bet,veen 
parties is essential. These are merely means to 
an end. Consequently~ if it appears that in the 
former suit a party having a like motive to cross-
examine about the same matters as the present 
party would have~ was accorded an adequate 
O]Jportunity for s1tch exantination~ the testimony 
may be received against the present party. Iden-
tity of interest, in the sense of motive, rather 
than technical identity of cause of action or title~ 
is the test.n (Emphasis added). 
And as to the require1nent of "identit~,. of issues" it is 
stated thusly at page ~91 of JicCor1nick's treatise: 
"l\Iust the forn1 of the proceeding~ the theory 
of the case~ or the nature of the relief sought 
be (the) same ? Though there have been occa-
sional holdings i1nposing such requiren1ents, it 
is 1nanifest that the~'" have no pertinence to the 
poliey- of adequacy of opportunity for cross-
exainination and the Inore convincing· opinions 
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reject the1n. * * * It seems, then, that the re-
quirenlent should be restated, not as one of 
identity or even of substantial identity of issues, 
but merely· as a requirement that the issues in 
the first proceeding and hence the purpose for 
,\·hich the testimony was there offered must have 
been such that the present opponent (or some 
person in like interest) had an adequate motive 
for testing on cross-examination the credibility 
of the testimony now offered." 
In an annotation in 70 A.L.R .. 2d 1179, 1181, it is stated 
as follo"rs with a1nple supporting authority: 
"'In a 1naj ority of the jurisdictions in which 
the courts have considered the question of the 
admissibility of testimony given in a criminal 
action in a subsequent civil proceeding, where 
the 'vitness who testified is no longer available, 
the forn1er testimony has been held admissible 
provided the person (or someone whose interests 
'vere the same) against whom the evidence is 
offered had the right of cross-examining the 
'vitness at the time he gave the testimony, and 
proYided also that the court determines the 
parties and issues involved in both cases are 
substantially the same." 
And, likewise, Professor 'Vigmore in Sec. 1388 of his 
monumental work on EYidence, 3rd Edition, concludes 
as follows: 
'·It ought, then to be sufficient to inquire 
1.chether the former testimony was given upon 
such an issue that the party opponent in that 
case had the san~c interest and motive in his cross-
e(ranzinatio1t that the present opponent has_; and 
the determination of this ought to be left entirely 
to the trial judge.'' (Emphasis not added). 
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In an annotation in 142 1\.L.R. at pages 696-700, a 
long list of cases supporting the above doctrine of 
Professor Wig1nore is set forth. An excellent recent 
case upon the point in issue herein was Travelers Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Wright~ (Okla. 1958) ~ 322 P.2d 417, 
70 A.L.R. 2d 1170, affirming the above rule stated by 
Wigmore, wherein the court held that "identity of 
issues" is to be determined bv considering the "issue" 
~ 
as that issue sought to be established by the witness 
'vhen he testified in the criminal case as "'"eighed 
against the issue sought to be proved by the witness 
in the subsequent civil case. The court then concluded 
as follows at page 1176 of 70 A.L.R. 2d: 
"As a general proposition '"e think testimony 
from a criminal case can be introduced in a sub-
sequent ciYil case where it appears that it is im-
possible to obtain the testimony of the witness 
who testified in the criminal case; that there 'Yas 
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness by 
the party against "·hom the testimony is sought 
to be used in the ciYil case, or by one "'"hose mo-
tiYe and interest in cross-examining 'Yas the 
same; and that there is an identity of issues." 
It is clear fro1n the authorities upon the subject 
that the underlying criterion for admissibility of prior 
testin1ony is the require1nent that there haYe been full 
opportunity for cross-exan1ina tion by the party against 
"·ho1n the eYidence is subsequently offered or bv sotne 
. . 
one "·hose interests "-ere the s:une as that party. In this 
regard it cannot be disputed that the X aYajo 'I'ribe 
certainly had the same interest at the inquest into the 
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death of 'rhotnas D. l~enally as do the plaintiffs-appel-
lants in this case, namely, the determination of whether 
or not that death \\'as brought about by the wrongful 
nets or conduct of the police officers who are respond-
ents herein. l\lr. Hanni admittedly represented the 
"Navajo 1.,ribe at said inquest and fully cross-examined 
Jlr. IJu ncan u,zJon the very point in issue relating to 
the substance and tirne of the comment made by Officer 
Ednnnzds pertaining to the booking of injured pris-
oners~ as well as upon all other aspects of Duncan's 
testimony. ( R. 368-369, 382~ 383, 386, 389-390, 394, 
395-398). The largest part of Duncan's testimony at 
the inquest was, in fact, elicited upon cross-examinatio11 
by Mr. Hanni. 
'l.,he cases cited by appellants relating to the ad-
missibility of former testimony given at a coroner's 
inquest are clearly inapplicable in the present case for 
the reason that the absolute requirement of an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witnesses therein involved 
had not been accorded to the parties against whon1 
such evidence "'as being subsequently offered or t{_) 
some person 'vhose interests and motives were substan-
tially the same. Respondents can11ot but agree with the 
holdings in those cases under the facts peculiar to those 
cases. Certainly if ~Ir. Hanni had not been present at 
the inquest on behalf of the Navajo Tribe and there 
had been no cross-examination by other persons whose 
interests or motives in cross-examining Duncan would 
have been the san1e as the survivors of the decedent. 
then in that event such evidence 'vould clearly have 
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been inadmissible in this action. This is the extent of 
the holdings cited in appellants' brief. BUT under the 
facts of this case, unusual though they may be, the 
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Duncan was not 
only accorded Mr. Hanni at the inquest but was seized 
upon by him with unusual vigor in light of his claim 
that such cross-examination was a matter of "grace" 
and thereby inhibited his adversary potential. 
With respect to the character of the tribunal and 
the proceeding in which the former testimony was taken, 
we again quote McCormick, supra, at page 496, as 
follows: 
"If the accepted requirements of the adminis-
tration of the oath, adequate opportunity to 
cross-examine on substantially the same issue 
and present unavailability of the 'vitness, are 
satisfied then the character of the tribunal 
whether judicial, legislative, or administrative, 
and the form of the proceedings are immateriat 
and the former testimony should be received." 
Citing Wigmore on Er·idc·nce, Sees. 1373, 1374. 
Thus, where the right of cross-examination 'vas granted 
at a coroner's hearing, the testimony there delivered 
has been held adtnissible in a subsequent action. JJ elJers 
v. State~ 33 Tex. Cr. 204, :!6 S.\,r. 196. And in a case 
involving testitnony before arbitrators, Bailey t\ Jfl. oods, 
17 N .I-I. 365, 373 ( 1845), the court held as follo"Ts: 
"It does not see1n. to be an objection to the 
con1petency of the evidence of the deceased wit-
ness~ that it "·as given at a hearing before arbi-
trators. \\r e do not understand that the adnlissi-
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bility of such evidence depends so much upon 
the particular character of the tribunal, as upon 
other tnatters. If the testimony be given under 
oath in a judicial proceeding, in which the ad-
,·erse litigant 'vas a party, and where he had the 
power to cross-exa1nine, and was legally called 
upon to do so, the great and ordinary tests of 
truth being no longer wanting, the testimony 
so given is admitted in any subsequent suit be-
t,veen the parties." 
In the end analysis the question of the admissibility 
of the testimony giYen by Duncan at the inquest rests 
upon the safeguards to its credibility. It was given 
under oath before a judicial officer and reported and 
transcribed by an official court reporter of the Third 
Judicial District. Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants 
was. present and was given every opportunity to cross-
examine the witness on any aspect of the death of Mr. 
Benally, which he did. The source of the claimed incon-
sistent statements alleged to have been made subse-
quent thereto is certainly not as well safeguarded and 
the inclusion of Jlr. Gregory's statement in appellants, 
brief should be entirely ignored as it in nowise was 
received in evidence by the lower court. The failure 
of the appellants to secure the testimony of Mr. Greg-
ory for the benefit of the lower court cannot, and should 
not, now be the basis upon which to invalidate the 
admission of :\Ir. Duncan's previous testimony as evi-
dence by the trial court. If claimed inconsistent state-
ments allegedly made subsequent to previously sworn 
testimony by a presently unavailable witness could 
render such previous testimony inadmissible in the 
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present proceeding, the "\veil-established rule permitting 
such evidence would be rendered a nullity. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COUR'l., DID NOT ERR IN 
GI'·TING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 21, 22 AXD 23. 
Appellants object to Instruction No. 22 apparently 
upon the assumption that Officer Robinson became an 
insurer of the decedent after observing his intoxicated 
condition and taking him into custody. '"fhis is not the 
law. The case was submitted to the jury upon the 
question of whether or not Robinson "\vas guilty oi 
wrongful performance of duty by the use of unreason· 
able force. In determining that question the jury was 
correctly instructed that if Benally's fall resulted from 
his own voluntary actions and intoxication there was 
no breach of duty by the use of unreasonable force on 
the part of Robinson. It is undoubtedly the la"? that 
one 'vho has voluntarilY disabled himself by reason of 
.. .. 
intoxication is held to the same degree of care and 
prudence in the interest of his own safety that is re-
quired of a sober person. 38 A1n. Jur.~ ).Tegligencc, 
Sees. 36, 203. Intoxication does not relieve a man from 
the degree of care required of a sober n1a11 in the sa1ne 
circtunstances. Vizacchcro t'. Rhode Island Co.~ 26 R.I. 
392, 59 .1\. 105, 69 L.R.A. 188. It "'"as also held in 
Pratt 'l\ O~I-la1·a. 135 l\Ie. 123, 190 A. 622, that one 
who undertakes to see an intoxicated person ho1ne does 
not becotne an insurer of his safe arriYal. Under the 
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circumstanees of this case, it \vas proper for the court 
to delineate to the jury the acts which "rould, and would 
not, sustain a verdict against Robinson for the use of 
unreasonable force against the decedent. Clearly, the 
voluntary actions of the decedent including his state 
of intoxication, if such actions caused his fall down 
the stairs could not be the basis upon which the jury 
could find an excessive use of force by the arresting 
officer. Insofar as the issue of Robinson's negligence 
is raised by appellants with respect to the giving of 
this instruction the court is directed to respondents' pre-
ceding argument under Points I and II . 
.1\ppellants also object to the giving of Instructions 
~1 and 23 upon the ground that such instructions pre-
clude the jury from rendering a verdict upon the 
grounds of negligence. Respondents incorporate herein 
the argument set forth under Points I and II here-
inabove in answer to that contention. 
CONCLUSION 
'fhe lo,ver court properly excluded the issue of 
negligence from detern1ination by the jury for the 
reason that there was no evidence of negligence on the 
part of defendant-respondent Robinson and the judg-
Inent and verdict of the lower court should be affirmed. 
,.,rith respect to the appellants' position that police 
officers should be held responsible for negligent acts 
of omission (nonfeasance) as well as negligent acts 
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of commission (misfeasance) in the performance of 
governmental duties it is clear that the courts have 
not seen fit to so extend the realm of liability. Police 
officers, in the performance of duties for which there 
is no liability on behalf of their employers, are properly 
immunized from liability for mere acts of omission or 
nonfeasance except in cases of affirmative duties 
created by statute. 'The lower court, therefore, was 
correct in gra11ting summary judgment to the defend-
ants-respondents Edmunds and Duncan and that 
judgment should be affirmed by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOl\tiER HOL~IGREN 
City Attorney 
J ACI( L. CRELLIN 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
E. L. SCHOENHALS 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 
Clifford G. Ed1nunds 
JED ''r· SHIELDS 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 
Louis ''r· Duncan 
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